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Abstract
We model a three fir  o ligopoly ( the S panish f ertilizer i ndustry f rom 1 976 t o 1988) 
which was subject to price regulation in the form of price ceilings. A theoretical and 
econometric model is developed in order to identify simultaneously the behaviour of the 
firm  and the degree to which regulation constrained the price. The collusive market-sharing 
arrangements involving asymmetric firms  and the l ess collusive outcomes of Cournot and 
Stackelberg, together with their constrained counterparts, are considered as particular 
behavioural hypotheses. The estimation of an aggregated and a disaggregated version of the 
model, by General Method of Moments techniques, leads us to identify the regulation-
constrained Stackelberg equilibrium as the most likely outcome given the observed data. 
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1. Introduction
Since the Bresnahan (1989) survey, the number of empirical studies of
industries with market power has been increasing. All such studies have in
common the use of a structural econometric approach and progress in the area has
been made by using individual data from firms by examining a richer set of
possible outcomes, and by refinin the methods used to test the behavioural
hypotheses. Recent examples of this type of work are Gasmi et al. (1992); Berndt
et al. (1990).
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Here we model a three fir oligopoly (the Spanish fertilizer industry from 1976
to 1988) which was subject to price regulation. A theoretical and econometric
model is developed in order to identify simultaneously the behaviour of the firm
and the degree to which regulation constrained the price. The collusive market-
sharing arrangements involving asymmetric firms and the less collusive outcomes
of Cournot and Stackelberg, together with their constrained counterparts, are
considered as particular behavioural hypotheses. The estimation of an aggregated
and a disaggregated version of the model, by General Method of Moments
(GMM) techniques, leads us to identify the regulation-constrained Stackelberg
equilibrium as the most likely outcome given the data of the market.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the characteristics of
the industry. Section 3 analyzes the working of the industry and the price
regulation. Section 4 is aimed at developing the theoretical and econometric
framework. Section 5 specifie the econometric model and considers the estima-
tion strategy. Section 6 presents the results of the estimation and in Section 7 some
concluding comments are presented. Appendix A and Appendix B consider,
respectively, the demand specificatio in the presence of international competition
restricted by the trade policy, and the econometric treatment of the firms
expectations. Finally, Appendix C gives some details on the data employed.
2. Industry characteristics
Our data (1976–1988) cover practically the entire period in which the industry
can be considered a typical oligopoly, protected from foreign competition by high
barriers until 1986. The industry had been consolidated in the sixties, with the
support of the authorities with the aim of substituting the high imports by home
production. At the beginning of the seventies supply became concentrated in three
firms one of them state owned, and prices were regulated. By 1989, as a result of
a process of mergers and the selling up of the public participation, the industry
became a single fir that went bankrupt at the beginning of the nineties.
The industry can be considered as the producer of two main substitute
1homogeneous goods, nitrogenous fertilizers and compound fertilizers , even
though we shall limit our analysis to the market of the firs good (see the
discussion of this issue in Section 4).
1Every type of fertilizer was sold, in fact, presenting a number of sub-varieties that differed in their
content of basic chemical elements. We aggregate the sub-varieties of each group in a single composite
commodity. Note that this can be done because every fir produced positive quantities of most of the
sub-varieties, and prices tended to reflec only the differences in chemical composition. In addition, the
firm did not show a geographical specialization of their productive capacities, which would have
implied a better treatment of the industry as a geographically differentiated one (on all this, see MINER
(1985)).
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Fig. 1. Demand for nitrogenous fertilizers.
Nitrogenous fertilizers were, at the time of the analysis, a mature product, with a
highly seasonal but stationary demand (see Fig. 1). High tariff and non-tariff
barriers to foreign competition kept imports at a negligible level until Spain
became a member of the European Community in 1986 (see Fig. 2). From 1986
Fig. 2. Imports of nitrogenous fertilizers.
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Fig. 3. Price evolution of the nitrogenous fertilizers.
on, barriers were progressively lessened, and price regulation was abandoned the
following year. The prices increased steadily until 1986, and fell after that year,
presumably as a result of the combination of cost changes and the new competitive
pressure (see Fig. 3).
In the period under review, 70% of the supply of nitrogenous fertilizers was
concentrated in three firm (ENFERSA, ERT and CROS), which accounted for
42%, 18% and 10% of the market respectively. ENFERSA was state owned, and
all three were also active in the market for compound fertilizers, where they had
shares inversely related to the previous ones. Their shares were remarkably stable
over time (see Fig. 4).
Public intervention in the industry was strong. There were subsidies for farmers,
as well as for producers for the acquisition of certain inputs and for investment.
Most of all, there was also price regulation.
3. Industry working and regulation: facts and hypotheses.
The price regulation took the form of price ceilings, the firm being free to
choose their prices at or below the ceiling. The regulator was a commission of the
Ministry of Economy (the ‘‘Junta Superior de Precios’’). The set of observable
facts that characterized the price controls can be summarized as follows. Firstly,
there was not any public statement about the rules to establish the regulated prices.
When regulation started, industry prices at the time were more or less accepted as
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Fig. 4. Market shares of the three firms
the maximum prices. However, it is likely that those prices were already
influence by public interventions. Secondly, the regulator proceeded at irregular
intervals to raise the maximum prices in order to take inflatio into account.
Occasionally, the regulator undertook cost and cost evolution studies, but there is
no clear information as to whether they were used. Thirdly, employers were
organized in a trade association that was allowed to present its proposals to the
regulator before every price change. On each occasion the firm put forward
jointly a price increase, in percentage terms, and the regulator proceeded by
authorizing an increase which was somewhat lower. Fourthly, the real transaction
prices did not at any moment significantl differ from the maximum approved
2prices .
This is basically a price-cap regulation scheme that did not, however, include
any of the usual automatic indexing rules of the price-caps. Probably, the aim was
to apply some ‘‘cost-of-service’’ (or ‘‘rate-of-return’’) regulation target, and some
discussion on the evolution of the input prices was allowed. The result can be seen
as a mixed mechanism with peculiar incentive properties. During the periods in
which the price remained fixed the firm were residual claimants of their cost
2 Fig. 3 depicts real transaction prices as collected by the Ministry of Agriculture. When compared
with the maximum prices until 1981, there only appear very small monthly differences probably due to
the effect of some slight seasonal discounts (see footnote 10). In any case, no signs of price wars can be
found. From 1981 to 1986, the Ministry considered it sufficien to quote directly maximum prices as
real transaction prices (see the steps).
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savings. When the reviews took place, the firm had the opportunity to modify
3their rents using their information advantages .
One possibility is that the firm and the regulator engaged in some bargaining
during the price reviews, whose repetition over time poses some difficul
questions. In particular it raises the possibility of a changing regulatory outcome,
either because the regulator learnt over time or because political and administrative
pressures influence its price target at each moment. However, the bargaining
processes could also give rise to a stable regulatory outcome, the statements of the
firm being only a revelation device used by the regulator. It must also be noted
that the apparent price divergences cannot even be taken as definit proof of real
conflict For instance, the firm could simply have proposed the price increments
that would be accepted, augmented in advance by the amount by which they knew
the regulator was going to reduce their proposal. So, we are left with a broad range
of possibilities, from an ineffective regulatory price ceiling to more constraining
outcomes, either stable or varying over time. Given this scenario, before building
our model we need to formulate our general hypotheses on the working of the
industry and the regulatory mechanism.
Firstly, as far as the firm are concerned, the evidence (absence of price wars)
indicates that the allocations reached must be considered self-enforcing agree-
ments, that were effectively adhered to by the firm over time. Therefore, we will
suppose that the firm agree explicitly on a (desired) unique price and on a
repartition of the corresponding quantities to be produced, i.e., the market shares.
But the ability of firm to communicate among each other is not a warranty of
agreeing on full collusive outcomes. The firm knew the individual incentives to
undercut some price levels, and they were conscious of the difficultie of detecting
and efficientl punishing these undercuts. We will therefore assume that the firm
either set a collusive outcome or simply agreed on a less than collusive price level.
In this context, it seems natural to consider as possible equilibrium outcomes all
the well known Nash equilibriums in quantities. The highest degree of collusion
will be represented by the market-sharing arrangements in the frontier of profit
4and the less collusive outcomes by the Cournot and Stackelberg solutions . The
Stackelberg equilibrium concept deserves special attention because the state owned
fir was created in 1973, by a merger of several smaller firms This can perhaps
be envisaged as a firs move giving leader advantages in capacity to this firm
3One can guess that the firm had greater knowledge about the evolution of demand and the input
prices. This suggests the importance of the adverse selection constraint of the regulator, and the
relevance of an incentive mechanism to trade off effort inducement and rent extraction (see Laffont and
Tirole (1993)).
4 See Schmalensee (1987) on collusive outcomes with asymmetric firms and Tirole (1988) on their
sustainability under trigger strategies. Cournot and Stackelberg can be seen as situations in which firm
have no incentive to start short run price wars given their capacities (see Kreps and Scheinkman
(1983); Dixit (1979), (1980)).
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Secondly, as far as the regulatory agency is concerned, the facts seem to suggest
a social welfare maximizing regulator, aimed at extracting rents from the firms but
we cannot preclude a priori that the regulator simply accepted and passed on the
firms price proposals (perhaps because it was a regulator captured by the
industry). Our treatment of the regulator will therefore avoid establishing any
specifi model (or a set of specifi models) of its behaviour. Instead, we will focus
5on the extent to which its decisions constrained the outcome desired by the firm .
It is important to note, however, that our framework will imply that we confin
ourselves to a class of regulation equilibrium outcomes which are stable over
6time .
Thirdly, as far as the interaction between the firm and the regulator is
concerned, we will assume as a starting point that the firm had a well define
desired equilibrium allocation (that is, the price and quantities that the firm would
implement if the regulator behaved simply as an auctioneer). Therefore, if the price
was going to be constrained to a lower level, the firm were forced—ifconflic had
to be avoided—toconsider the sharing of the production of an additional output.
We will take into account forms (mainly proportional) of sharing this output, but
the properties of these ‘‘second-best’’ allocations remain in most cases a
theoretically open question (however, see Daughety (1984) on one of these
equilibriums). In any case, incentives to undercut the agreed price can be
considered prevented again by trigger strategies.
To sum up, we address the problem of identifying the behaviour of the firm
assuming that they agreed on some specifi self-enforcing allocation. But, at the
same time, we make no assumption regarding the degree to which the regulator
constrained the price desired by the firms We will even allow that the regulator
acted simply as an institutional device to obtain a unique price. Therefore, the
identificatio of behaviour includes the problem of identificatio of the effective-
ness of the regulation. In the rest of this paper, we shall refer to the two polar
cases as situations of binding and non-binding regulation.
4. Theoretical framework
In this section we shall develop a theoretical and econometric model for the
industry. Firstly, we establish the framework to deal with the demand. Secondly,
5 It seems rather difficul to fin a sensible set of equilibrium concepts for the regulatory outcomes.
For instance, the previous discussion on the regulatory mechanism suggests the likely relevance of
some repeated bargaining perfect bayesian equilibrium. But, as is known, it is difficul to fin
satisfactory unique solutions for these types of models (see Fudemberg and Tirole (1993)).
6 This is a strong constraint, that could possibly be relaxed by adding an equation aimed at modelling
the regulator parameter as a result of the bargaining processes. But this will further complicate the
model and it is a rather pointless exercise in the absence of a more definit theoretical framework for
the regulatory process.
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we present our assumptions about the technology of the firms Thirdly, we
consider the timing of the decisions. Fourthly we set the likely equilibrium
outcomes that we will consider as possible non-binding regulation results. Fifthly,
we study their constrained counterparts. Finally, we also build an aggregated
version of the model.
In the rest of this paper, only the nitrogenous fertilizers market is considered.
This focus, which cannot be avoided for data reasons, deserves a word of caution.
The scenario of three firm competing in two demand-related markets (nitrogenous
and compound fertilizers), even with the assumption of independent constant
marginal costs of producing the goods, raises the question of the relevance of
7multimarket interaction . The available evidence points clearly to multimarket
equilibrium outcomes: price wars were absent from both markets, the maximum
prices tended to move in a parallel way, and the uneven fir shares across markets
can be an indication of cost–advantages-based allocations. This seems to suggest
that, in principle, equilibriums should be define and characterized across both
markets. However, there is an asymmetry feature of the markets which makes
treating the nitrogenous fertilizers market in isolation a sensible alternative.
The demand for nitrogenous fertilizers shows a strong effect of the price of
compound fertilizers. But there is some evidence of a weaker effect in the opposite
direction, perhaps because of the relatively innovative character of the compound
fertilizers, that were used increasingly during the period. This gives some
reliability to what can be gathered from the modelled market. While the analyzed
outcomes will be clearly influence by the equilibrium in the other market, and
will constitute only part of the entire picture, they will be a legitimate approxi-
8mation to what is happening in the whole industry .
7On the one hand, any fir endowed with some market power and operating in both markets will
take into account the demand-link between the two markets. As a consequence, the competing firm are
likely to internalize these links in their strategic interaction (see, for example, Bulow et al. (1985)). On
the other hand, multimarket contact is likely to facilitate collusive outcomes. For instance, Berheim and
Whiston (1990) show this effect, and emphasize its reinforcement when some fir asymmetries are
present.
8Given a multimarket equilibrium in two related markets, if there is some asymmetry in the price
cross-effects in demands, the interaction effects are more important to characterize the equilibrium in
the market that provokes the strongest externality than in the other. More formally, suppose that there
N N N C C C N C N N C Care two related markets with demands q 5q ( p , p ) and q 5q ( p , p ), and let p (q , q , q , q )i i j i j
be the global profi function of competitor i ( j indexes the output of his rivals). A (quantities)
multimarket equilibrium will imply, for example, the following firs order condition for fir i in market
N,
N N C N≠p ≠p ≠q ≠p ≠qi N N N C] ]] ]]5 p 1 q 2 c 1 q 5 0i i iN N N N N
≠q ≠q ≠q ≠q ≠qi i i
C NA sufficien condition for vanishing the last term is that (≠q /≠p ) be small enough, independently of
N C(≠q /≠p ) being strong or not. In that case, the firs order conditions in the N market will tend to form
N Na system of equations relating exclusively p and the q quantities. However, the equilibrium
allocation in C influence the outcome in N through the demand function.
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4.1. The demand side
On the demand side, we will assume that the domestic nitrogenous fertilizers
can be considered a homogeneous good imperfectly substitutable by the imports of
the same good. As far as imports are concerned, we shall assume that the domestic
producers acted parametrically with respect to the international price inclusive of
tariffs, and that the actual imports depend on that price and the rationing imposed
by administrative methods. In this setting, the relevant domestic demand must
include the international price inclusive of tariffs and an indicator of the likely
spillovers coming from the rationed imports (see Appendix A for details). This
demand function, if rightly specified embodies all the relevant information about
the changes in trade policy throughout the period (e.g. dismantling of trade barriers
during the last years) from the point of view of the optimization problem of the
9domestic firm .
Demand, specifie in quantities, will be modelled by the following linear
relationship,
q 5 a 1 z9a 2 bp
where a and b are positive parameters, z represents the whole vector of variables
that shift demand, and a its associated parameters. In Section 5 we detail the
specificatio of this relationship, including the treatment of seasonality.
4.2. The firm ’ technology
According to a long run view of the oligopolist interaction, we will consider
capital as a variable input. In addition, we will assume that every input is used in
fixe proportions to output. Therefore, the firms marginal costs will be constant
over the production ranges and can be specifie as a linear function of the input
prices. Furthermore, we will allow the firm to experience different marginal costs
because of different input prices or technological differences (input coefficient ).
That is, for every fir i we will take marginal cost to be,
0N E p Ki i Ki i
] ] ]]c 5w 1 p 1 uci i Ei iq q qi i i
where w represents the labour cost per worker and N the number of workers, pE
the price of a specifi material and E its quantity (here we isolate a single material
9However, the progressive trade policy changes of the last three years of the sample may have also
induced changes in behaviour. We will ignore this possibility because of the lack of enough degrees of
freedom to test models with switching behaviour for such a short period.
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for simplicity, in fact they can be several), and uc the user cost of capital (the
capital being valued at prices of some base year) define as,
tpK
]uc 5 (r 1 d 2 (12 d)p ) 5 (r 1 d 2 (12 d)p ) P (11 p )11 0 11 s
s51pK
where r stands for the relevant interest rate, d for the depreciation rate, p for thek
current price of the capital goods, and p for its rate of increase in period s.s
Replacing the unknown coefficient by parameters to be estimated, we have,
9c 5 b w 1 p b 1 b uc i 5 1, 2, 3i i1 i Ei i2 i3 i
which will be our specificatio of firms marginal costs.
4.3. Timing
Some words about the timing of the optimal decisions. On the one hand, we will
ignore the possibility of prices varying seasonally. The reason is that firm seem to
10have avoided this practice . On the other hand, and more important, we will
assume that the optimization problem of the firm is separable over time in a
number of maximization problems equal to the number of price reviews. The
demand schedule is known by the firm which, in addition, are endowed at the
price reviews with expectations about the values of all the demand and cost shift
variables. We will suppose that these expectations are given by a forecast of the
average values of the variables during the interval between reviews, from which
the firm consider that the actual per-period values will diverge only by
unpredictable random shocks. These forecasts will be only actualized before the
price reviews. So, the firm have an expectation on the (average) output they will
be able to sell at each price and, given behaviour, they are able at the price reviews
to assess their optimal price (quantities) for the number of periods ahead in which
the maximum price will remain sticky. It is this optimal price that they will try to
pass on.
Note that, given our assumptions, firm could no be better off by selecting the
optimal values at each period if it were to be done before knowing the realization
of the unexpected shock. Therefore, there is no incentive to revise the optimal
10 In fact, by 1986, a new system of varying maximum prices according to a seasonal schedule was
announced by the authorities to replace the old system of a constant maximum price. The alleged
reason was to favour the access of the farmers to price discounts according to the storage costs they
assumed. Several reasons for which producers tended to reduce to a minimum the seasonal price
variations can be suggested. Firstly, optimal intertemporal pricing tends to reduce price variations for
storable commodities in the presence of short-run increasing marginal costs (see Phlips (1983)).
Secondly, firm could fin it more difficul to monitor an agreement with a scheme of discounts.
Thirdly, firm could fin that by avoiding raising prices in the high-demand season, temptations to
undercut prices were prevented (see Rotemberg and Saloner (1986)).
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values during the interval between price reviews. In this context, all the demand
(and cost) variables in this section must be considered expectations, and the
expressions can be thought of as representing interchangeably interval or per-
period relationships. These assumptions will allow us using the available in-
formation at its highest degree of temporal disaggregation. The way to do so and
the econometric implications will be considered in Section 5.
4.4. Non-binding regulation
We should now specify the behaviour of the firms Consider firs the case in
which regulation is not binding. In this setting, we will take into account two types
of possible equilibrium outcomes: the full collusive market-sharing arrangements
and the less collusive equilibriums of Cournot and Stackelberg.We will now show
that these outcomes may be seen as determining particular values and constraints
on the parameters of a general linear simultaneous econometric model (as, for
example, in Gasmi et al. (1992)).
The efficien market-sharing arrangements may be characterized from the
resolution of the following program,
¯p > p2 2Max p 5 p(q)q 2 c q s.t.1 1 1 1 ¯q ,q ,q p > p1 2 3 3 3
that is, the maximization of fir 1 profit subject to profi targets for firm 2 and
113 . The firs order conditions of this problem, given the specificatio of the
demand, may be written as,
3 1
]2O r q 1 r p 2 r c 5 0 i 5 1, 2, 3j j i i ibj51
with r 5 1, and where the r’s represent the Lagrange multipliers. Each couple of1
values of the r and r depict a point on the frontier of profits2 3
The firs order conditions may be rearranged in the following way,
31
]p 5 Or q 1 c i 5 1, 2, 3 (1)j j ibri j51
which makes their behavioural interpretation clearer: price will be set over
marginal costs according to the specifi market-sharing arrangement. If we can
consider the r’s stable over time, this equations provide a test that involves
observable variables (price, quantities and costs) to assess the likelihood of this
type of allocations. The stability of the r’s seems a realistic assumption if the
11There are other ways to characterize the same equilibrium points (for instance, fir 1 choosing the
price and shares that maximize its profit for given profi targets for firm 2 and 3), but we fin the use
of the previous format advantageous.
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(asymmetric) fir unit costs grow more or less at the same pace. In this setting,
firm could easily agree on increasing the price by the same amount as costs,
without changing the distribution of profits In addition, it can be shown that the
r’s equal the ratios of the price–cost margin of fir 1 with respect to the margins
of the other firms and the stability of the relative margins seems a sensible rule to
apply over time for the sake of coordination.
Let us now consider the outcomes of Cournot and Stackelberg. The Cournot
equilibrium can be characterized from the resolution of the individual programs,
Max p 5 p(q)q 2 c q i 5 1, 2, 3i i i iqi
when firm take as given the output of the rivals. Given our demand specification
the firms firs order equations can be written as,
1
]p 5 q 1 c i 5 1, 2, 3 (2)i ib
As far as the Stackelberg equilibrium is concerned assume, without loss of
generality, that fir 1 is the leader and firm 2 and 3 the followers. The behaviour
of both followers will be characterized by equations like Eq. (2). Then, it is easy
to show that the behaviour of the leader can be characterized from the resolution
of the program,
a 1 z9a 1 1
]]] ] ]Max p 5 p(q)q 2 c q s.t. p(q)5 2 q 1 (c 1 c )1 1 1 1 1 2 3q 3b 3b 31
This will give the leader firs order condition,
1
]p 5 q 1 c (3)1 13b
So, let us formulate a general linear simultaneous econometric model integrated
by four equations, the demand relationship and the three individual price
equations. In a conventional form, this model can be written as,
q 1 q 1 q 1 bp 2 z9a 2 a 5 e1 2 3 0
g q 1 g q 1 g q 2 p 1 b w 1 p9 b 1 b uc 5 e11 1 12 2 13 3 11 1 E 12 13 1 1
g q 1 g q 1 g q 2 p 1 b w 1 p9 b 1 b uc 5 e21 1 22 2 23 3 21 2 E 22 23 2 2
g q 1 g q 1 g q 2 p 1 b w 1 p9 b 1 b uc 5 e31 1 32 2 33 3 31 3 E 32 33 3 3
where the e’s are random disturbances.
The model has four endogenous variables (q , q , q and p), some pre-1 2 3
determined cost variables and a number of predetermined demand variables equal
to the length of z9 (plus the constant). It is easy to verify that the parameters of this
general model are identified In fact every equation meets the order and rank
conditions and they are all over-identified
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Table 1
The output parameters of the linear model under different behavioural assumptions
g g g g g g g g g11 12 13 21 22 23 31 32 33
Non-binding regulation:
r r r r1 1 1 1 12 3 3 2
] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ]Market sharing
b b b br b br br br b2 2 3 3
1 1 1
] ] ]Cournot 0 0 0 0 0 0
b b b
1 1 1
] ] ]Stackelberg 0 0 0 0 0 0
3b b b
Binding regulation:
dr dr dr drd d d d d2 3 3 2
]]] ]]] ]]] ]]]] ]]]] ]]]] ]]]] ]]]] ]]]]Market sharing
(11 (12 d )s )b (11 (12 d )s )b (11 (12 d )s )b s s s s s* * * * * * * *
] ] ] ] ]11 (12 d ) br 11 (12 d ) b 11 (12 d ) br 11 (12 d ) br 11 (12 d ) br 11 (12 d ) bS D S D S D S D S D S D2 2 3 3r r r r r2 2 2 3 3 3
d d d
]]] ]]] ]]]Cournot 0 0 0 0 0 0
(11 (12 d )s )b (11 (12 d )s )b (11 (12 d )s )b* * *1 2 3
d d d
]]] ]]] ]]]Stackelberg 0 0 0 0 0 0
s (11 (12 d )s )b (11 (12 d )s )b* * *1 2 3
]11 (12 d ) 3bs d3
d 1 1
]] ] ]Stackelberg (with S-repartition) 0 0 0 0 0 0
b b(22 d )3b
* * * *Notes: s 5s 1r s 1r s .1 2 2 3 3
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Table 2
Constraints on the output parameters under the different behavioural assumptions
Output parameters
Own output Cross outputs
Non-binding regulation:
1 1
] ]Market sharing g 5 g 5 g 5 g g 5 g g 5 g g 511 22 33 12 21 13 31 23 32 2b b
1
]Cournot g 5 g 5 g 5 g 5g 5g 5g 5g 5g 5011 22 33 12 13 21 23 31 32b
1 1
] ]Stackelberg g 5 , g 5 g 5 g 5g 5g 5g 5g 5g 5011 22 33 12 13 21 23 31 323b b
Binding regulation:
Market sharing g g 5g g , g g 5g g , g g 5g g12 21 11 22 13 31 11 33 23 32 22 33
Cournot g 5g 5g 5g 5g 5g 5012 13 21 23 31 32
Stackelberg g 5g 5g 5g 5g 5g 5012 13 21 23 31 321
]Stackelberg (with S-repartition) g 5 g 5 g 5g 5g 5g 5g 5g 5022 33 12 13 21 23 31 32b
Each one of the considered equilibrium outcomes imposes a number of
constraints on this general model. These constraints involve the price parameter of
the demand equation and the output parameters of the price equations. Table 1
gives the output parameters of the general model in terms of the underlying
parameters, and Table 2 gives the corresponding constraints. They are simply
non-linear cross-equation constraints combined with some exclusion constrains
(the cross-output parameters in the cases of Cournot and Stackelberg).
4.5. Binding regulation
Let us turn now to the case in which regulation is binding. In this case, the
observed price and quantities will not coincide with the desired allocation (that is,
the price and quantities that the firm would implement if the regulator behaved
simply as an auctioneer). Here, we shall make two basic assumptions: that the
firm would reach a well define equilibrium if regulation were not binding, and
that the regulator sets the maximum price by reducing the desired price by a fixe
proportion. The firs assumption gives a precise content to the concept of desired
price. In particular, we will consider as many possible desired prices as non-
regulation-constrained outcomes we have considered. The second assumption will
be used as a useful feature to develop the conditions for the identificatio of
behaviour in the presence of binding regulation.
Binding regulation will therefore be characterized by the following relationship,
*p 5 dp with d < 1
*that is, the p ceiling price will be a constant proportion of the p desired price. At
this price demand will be greater than it would have been at the desired price, and
14
the additional output to be produced may be written as a function of the regulated
price and the delta parameter in the following way,
12 d
]]* S Dq 2 q 5 b p
d
The firms problem is therefore the distribution of this additional output that the
market will demand.With constant marginal costs and positive margins, every fir
is willing to take on the production of this additional output. Accordingly, we need
to specify what will be the repartition rule. We will consider two possibilities.
Firstly, we will consider that the firm divide the output increment according to
their shares in the non-binding-regulation equilibrium solution. Schmalensee
(1987) suggested that reducing output while maintaining the market shares at their
non-collusive level could be a sensible collusion ‘‘technology’’. Here, in an
inverse but similar way, we assume that expanding output proportionately from the
desired allocation may be a simple procedure for coordination. In this case, the
following relationship between the observed and desired quantities will hold,
12 d
]]* * * S Dq 5 s q 5 q 1 s b pi i i i d
*where s stands for the equilibrium shares. Then the equations that characterize
the different (desired) equilibrium outcomes may be rewritten under binding
regulation in terms of the observable price and quantities and the delta parameter.
Eq. (1) will be transformed into,
3d d
]] ]p 5 O r q 1 c i 5 1, 2, 3 (1‘)j j im br mi i ij51
1
] *where m 5 11 (12 d ) os r . Eq. (2) will give,i j jri j
d d
] ]p 5 q 1 c i 5 1, 2, 3 (2‘)i im b mi i
*with m 511(12d )s , and Eq. (3) for the Stackelberg leader will be,i i
d d
]] ]p 5 q 1 c (3‘)1 13m b m1 1
*with m 511(12d )(s /3).1 1
Secondly, we may consider an alternative for the situation in which there is a
Stackelberg leader. If a fir plays this role in the determination of the non-
binding-regulation outcome, it seems natural to consider that it will also be able to
assume this role in the repartition of the additional output. In this case, the leader
would select the best point on the reaction curves of the rivals that is compatible
with the constraint imposed by regulation (see Daughety (1984)). This will modify
the previous shares, and the new equations for the leader and the followers will be,
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d d 1
]] ] ]p 5 q 1 c and p 5 q 1 c i 5 2, 3 (3‘‘)1 1 i i3m b m b1 1
where m 5(22d ).1
This completes the examination of the equilibrium outcomes under binding-
regulation. As before, Table 1 gives the parameters of the general model in terms
of the underlying parameters, and Table 2 summarizes the constraints they impose.
Here there appears to be a specifi characteristic to be noted. The market-sharing
and the second Stackelberg (Stackelberg with S-repartition) equilibriums imply, as
before, some non-linear cross-equation constraints. But, Cournot and Stackelberg
under binding regulation only imply the same set of exclusion constraints (the
cross-output parameters). Therefore, selection between these two equilibrium
concepts will not be possible on the same grounds as in the other cases. This
discussion will be continued in Section 5.
Fig. 5 gives a version of the equilibrium outcomes considered so far. The figur
is drawn under the simplifying assumption that firm 2 and 3 are identical.
Consider firstl the non-binding setting. The curve closer to the origin in the
q-plane is the convex Pareto frontier of profit when firm have constant but
Fig. 5. Market outcomes under binding and non-binding regulation.
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different marginal costs. A market-sharing arrangement (MS) will lie on it. The
line to the right of this curve represents the reaction curve of firm 2 and 3 to fir
1. The unconstrained Cournot (C) and Stackelberg (S) equilibriums will lie on it.
Consider now the binding regulation situation. If regulation is binding, there is a
maximum price or, equivalently, a minimum output to be produced. Only the
shaded area of the q-plane represent outcomes which are compatible with the price
constraint. On the frontier of this area, we will consider points that represent the
repartition of the additional output to be produced according to the shares of the
desired unconstrained equilibriums (MS9, C9, S9) and an equilibrium on the former
reaction curve to the leader decisions (S0, Stackelberg with S-repartition).
4.6. An aggregated model
All the equations developed so far to represent equilibrium solutions have been
shown to be particular cases of a general linear simultaneous econometric model.
In each case, every structural parameter is identified even the regulation
parameter. However, the coefficient of the linear model are, in general, non-linear
functions of the structural parameters. In addition, the identificatio of the general
econometric model hinges, both in the non-binding and binding cases, on the
availability of different input prices for each firm If input prices were the same,
the sole difference among the three individual equations of the general model
would be the parameters to be estimated. As identificatio may prove to be
difficul in these circumstances, and our disaggregated data are not so reliable, we
will also develop an aggregated version of the model. The empirical part of this
paper will be based on the combined use of the two versions.
Eq. (1), conveniently rearranged, gives the output to be produced for each fir
as a function of its cost, the price set, the parameters representing behaviour and
the shares of the firms
b




Eq. (2) gives, similarly, q 5b(p2c ) for i51, 2, 3, and Eq. (3) can bei i
transformed into q 53b(p2c ).1 1
So, by aggregating quantities and findin the price in each non-binding
equilibrium outcome, it becomes clear that the aggregate price equation can be put
in the format,
1 1
] ]p 5 q 1 O v c (4)i ibA A i
where A5ov and the v’s depend on behaviour. With a market-sharingi
i
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arrangement, it is easy to check that A51. Similarly, under Cournot A53 and
under Stackelberg A55.
Now, if either the input prices are the same for every fir or we only dispose of
an average of the input prices, we can formulate the following two equation
simultaneous model,
q 1 bp 2 z9a 2 a 5 u0
9gq 2 p 1 b w 1 p b 1 b u 5 u1 E 2 3 c 1
Testing behaviour with this model in a non-binding regulation setting amounts
simply to a test of the values of the cross-constraints on the b and g parameters.
The market-sharing arrangement implies g 5(1 /b), Cournot behaviour g 5(1 /3b)
and Stackelberg g 5(1 /5b).
Taking Eq. (4) as a relationship among the desired variables, and replacing them
by their expression in terms of the observed ones and the delta regulation
parameter, we obtain,
1 1
]] ]]p 5 q 1 O v c (4‘)i ibw(A) w(A) i
where w(A)5(1 /d )[A1(12d )]. Then, under binding regulation, the g parameter
of the aggregated model will be a function of the behaviour and the constraint
imposed by regulation. So, we cannot simultaneously identify these two aspects of
the working of the market. However, the estimation of this model might still be
useful. As d <1, this implies that A<w(A), and some behavioural patterns could
be excluded with the estimation of g. Furthermore, with some a priori information
about d, it is possible to speculate about the likely behaviour.
5. Econometric specificatio and strategy.
Nitrogenous fertilizers are an input for agricultural producers. Accordingly, we
use a conditional demand for inputs approximation to formulate the demand
equation. This is, by the way, the perspective adopted for most of the studies about
the demand for fertilizers (see Burrell (1989) for a survey). We therefore need to
decide which are the substitute and complementary inputs whose prices must be
included in the equation, what is the right agricultural output measure, and what
are the control variables. From a theoretical point of view, the demand relationship
should be homogeneous of degree zero in the input prices. But, as we are working
at a high degree of aggregation, we will not impose this constraint.We will simply
verify to what extent this condition is approximately fulfilled
Our dependent variable will be the quantity of nitrogenous fertilizers (QNIT), in
thousands of tons, sold in the domestic market and the (negligible) quantity sold in
the foreign markets.We will be able to use indifferently the quantity sold either by
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all the producers or by our three main producers without any significan change.
The demand for fertilizers is highly seasonal and, as our basic data are monthly,
we will need to take this seasonality into account. This was accomplished in the
firs phases of the work by the introduction of a set of monthly dummies, which
´were later constrained in estimation to a four period seasonal schedule (see Pazo,
1994).
Our main independent variable is the price of the nitrogenous fertilizers (PNIT).
As far as the prices of the other inputs are concerned, we will take into account the
price of the compound fertilizers (PCOMP), and the international price of the
nitrogenous fertilizers inclusive of tariffs (PIMP), both substitute inputs, and the
price of seeds (PSEED), a complementary input. The output on which we will
condition demand will be the general agricultural output (AGOUT). Over time,
two variables will be used to control for the heterogeneity of the crops and the
exogenously determined productivity: the average quality of the cultivated areas
(QUAL) and climatology (CLIM). In order to pick up the presumably important
effects of the reduction in the non-tariff barriers on imports, we will also include
separately within the equation an estimation of the ad-valorem tariff (T). We
expect this variable to play the role of indicator of the evolution of the quantity
restrictions on imports. The assumption is, of course, that the tariff and the
non-tariff barriers on imports evolved similarly over time.
On the other hand, in the price equation (equations) we will have the price of the
nitrogenous fertilizers as a dependent variable and the corresponding output
measure (output measures) as the firs explanatory variable. As input price
variables, we will include the price of fuel (PFUEL), the price of naphtha
(PNAPH), the labour costs (WAGE) and the user cost of capital (UC).
The estimation of the demand relationship and the price equation (equations)
sets a typical problem of simultaneous estimation that, however, presents some
important econometric peculiarities. Output appears in the price equations as a key
variable to identify the behaviour of the firm and the relevant output, given our
theoretical discussion, is the expected (average) output at the moment the price is
chosen. Since we only dispose of data for the observed sold output, on a monthly
basis, we must study the conditions under which we can replace in our estimation
the expected by the observed output.
According to our model, the observed monthly output will diverge from the
relevant expected (average) output for two reasons. Firstly, by a seasonal
systematic factor. Secondly, by a composite disturbance term with two com-
ponents. The firs component is the forecasting error on the level of the average
output incurred presumably at each review. This error will remain constant during
the interval between reviews and we will assume it to be uncorrelated across
reviews. The second component consists of the zero mean unexpected shocks
around the forecasted mean. As a consequence of this structure, the composite
disturbance term will be a zero mean error autocorrelated over time.
From the econometric point of view, this setting implies some consequences
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(see Appendix B for technical detail). Firstly, the replacement of the expected
output by the actual output in the price equation must be accompanied by the
inclusion of the seasonal dummies (to control for the systematic divergences), and
the recognition that this output will be correlated with the (presumably autocorre-
12lated) error term . Secondly, endogenity plus a likely autocorrelated error term
calls for a proper instrumental variables procedure of estimation. This is the reason
for which we will use GMM techniques to obtain consistency (see Hansen (1982);
Hansen and Singleton (1982) and the survey by Ogaki (1993)). Thirdly, the sticky
price set in advance will be independent of the subsequent unexpected shocks and,
in consequence, can be exogenous in the demand equation.
We shall now explain our econometric strategy to deal with the problem of
identifying simultaneously the behaviour of the firm and the character of the
regulation. In principle, the direct estimation of the disaggregated model should be
sufficien to identify behaviour and the constraint imposed by regulation. All the
parameters of the general linear model are identified and these parameters are in
general non-linear functions of the underlying structural parameters that character-
ize the equilibrium outcomes. This is the situation both in the cases of non-binding
and binding regulation, where the structural parameters include in the last case the
d regulation parameter. In this setting, each model could be estimated by
non-linear methods and compared with the others. But most of the equilibrium
outcomes imply, however, a set of specifi constraints on the parameters of the
general linear model. Such equilibriums, then, can be tested against the general
specificatio simply by testing the constraints they impose. There are two
equilibriums, however, that impose the same (exclusion) constraints on the general
model. These are the regulation constrained Cournot and Stackelberg outcomes,
whose structural parameters turn out be exactly identifie under the exclusion
constraints (i.e. the k parameters of the linear model are in fact k non-linear
functions of the set of k underlying parameters). If the constraints imposed by
these two models could be accepted, all the others being rejected (as will in fact be
the case, see Section 6), the selection between them should be based on the
comparison of the estimates they give.
Unfortunately, data limitations prevent us from using the disaggregated model
as an exclusive way to infer our conclusions. The identificatio of the parameters
requires the use of the firms outputs and relies heavily on the availability of
different input prices for each firm But, as can be appreciated in Appendix C,
detailed fir outputs are not available at the same level of time periodicity as total
output, and specifi fir prices are only available for some of the inputs.
Therefore, in order to draw our inferences we will use the aggregated and
disaggregated versions of the model together.
12Note that the demand equation is also likely to present some residual autocorrelation, as it is
estimated including some explanatory variables, observed only imperfectly (averaged over the interval
between reviews).
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Firstly, we will use the aggregate model to try to reduce the number of likely
outcomes. Recall that this model cannot identify separately behaviour and the
regulation constraint, but it can be used advantageously to reject some extreme
hypotheses. In practice, this model will allow us to reject the full collusive
outcomes.We will therefore rely on the disaggregated model to try to select among
the remaining equilibrium concepts. Despite the data limitations, the disaggregated
model seems to perform rather well for the models that exclude the appearance of
the cross-outputs in the price equations. In fact, finall we will be left with two
non-rejected equilibrium concepts.
6. Econometric results
In this section, we summarize the main results of our econometric analysis.
First, we present the results of a previous separated estimation of the aggregated
demand and price equations. Then, we proceed to explain the results of the fully
simultaneous estimation of both the aggregated and disaggregated versions of the
model. Finally, we describe the testing procedure applied to determine the most
likely outcome given the data.
Table 3 presents the results of the separate estimation of the demand and price
equations of the aggregated model. The demand equation, estimated by ordinary
least squares (OLS), seems a rather good specification All the coefficient have
the expected signs, and the resulting equation is not too far from being
homogeneous of degree zero in input prices. The equation shows a sensible own
price elasticity (2.08), a somewhat stronger elasticity with respect to the price of
the compound fertilizers, a near unity elasticity with respect to the price of imports
and a high sensitivity to the non-tariff barriers. The peculiar dynamics shown by
the price of the compound fertilizers could perhaps be interpreted as a result of a
change in the degree of use of this substitute input.
A Hausman test of the exogenity of PNIT in the demand equation, using the
cost variables of the price equation as instruments, does not reject it (the same
conclusion is obtained when the exogenity of PCOMP is tested). As has been
remarked in Section 5, there are some theoretical reasons that can justify this
conclusion. In any case, this apparent exogenity may also be the result of a poor
instrumentation of the variable and will be repeatedly tested.
The price equation has been estimated by instrumenting the output with the
exogenous variables of the demand equation, except PNIT. The signs of the
coefficient are as expected, their values are perfectly admissible, and the equality
constraints of the separately estimated values of the seasonal dummies (see
Appendix B) are accepted in two cases and marginally rejected in two others.
Table 4 presents the joint estimation of the aggregated model by the GMM.We
experimented with several estimations, the main difference being the consideration
of PNIT as an exogenous or endogenous variable in the demand equation. We
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Table 3
Aggregated model: separate estimation (sample period: 76.01–88.12; Nº of observations: 144)
Variables and statistics Parameters Standard
and values errors
Demand equation (dependent variable: QNIT)
22PNIT 20.013 0.221?10
22*PCOMP (25) 0.014 0.263?10
22*PCOMP (21) 0.014 0.255?10
PIMP (21) 1.20 0.384
PSEED (27) 20.86 0.227
T (22) 14.48 2.998
AGOUT 1.08 0.320
AGOUT (212) 0.40 0.114
QUAL (21) 212.14 5.053














1. The demand equation includes a constant and three seasonal dummies (D , D and D ). The price1 2 4
equation includes the complete set of the seasonal dummies (D to D , see Appendix C). Both1 4
equations include a small number of dummies which account for some outliers.
2. The variable lags, quoted in brackets, imply a reduction in the number of used observations (from
*156 to 144). PCOMP (25) is the price of compound fertilizers, lagged fiv months, from the
*beginning of the sample to December 1985. PCOMP (21) is the same price, lagged one month, from
January 1986 to the end of the sample. Several tests on the stability of the parameter lead to this
specification
3. The demand equation is estimated by OLS. The price equation by IV. The instruments used are the
cost variables plus all the explanatory variables in the demand equation with the exception of PNIT. All
standard errors are (White) heteroskedasticity robust.
4. An F test for the stability of the coefficient across the two sub-periods 1976.01–1985.12 and
1986.01–1988.12 gives 0.58. Then, stability is accepted.
5. The Q(12)-statistic of the price equation clearly indicates some time autocorrelation of the errors.
The re-estimation of this equation with an MA(3) structure in the errors accounts for this auto-
correlation without altering the basic results.
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Table 4
Aggregated model: joint estimation (sample period: 76.01–88.12: Nº of observations: 144)
Variables and statistics Parameters Standard
and values errors
Demand equation (dependent variable: QNIT)
22PNIT 20.011 0.109?10
22*PCOMP (25) 0.014 0.141?10
22*PCOMP (21) 0.014 0.139?10
PIMP (21) 1.10 0.185
PSEED (27) 20.89 0.120
T (22) 14.01 2.427
AGOUT 0.86 0.178
AGOUT (212) 0.37 0.067
QUAL (21) 29.09 2.789
CLIM (21) 1 (25) 0.21 0.022
Standard error 24.74
2R 0.81








2Joint statistic: Sargan test X (26)518.57
Notes:
1. See notes 1 and 2 for Table 1.
2. This estimation is carried out by imposing the cross equation constraints on the seasonal dummies.
3. The two equations are jointly estimated by GMM, allowing for time autocorrelation in the errors in
the form of a MA(6). The instruments used in the demand equation are all the variables of this
equation. The instruments used in the price equation are the cost variables plus all the explanatory
variables in the demand equation with the exception of PNIT. Standard errors are asymptotically robust
to heteroskedasticity.
present our preferred estimates, which have been obtained by imposing the
theoretical cross-constraints on the seasonal dummies, by allowing for a MA(6) in
the disturbances, by considering PNIT to be exogenous in the demand equation,
and by using all the variables of this equation (except PNIT), in conjunction with
the cost variables, as instruments for the price equation. The Sargan test supports
to the validity of the used instruments. The other variants do not alter the basic
results.
Table 5 presents the joint estimation of the four equations of the disaggregated
model. The poor statistical results achieved in previous estimations with the fully
unconstrained general model, together with the behavioural results obtained in the
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Table 5
Disaggregated model: joint estimation (sample period: 76.01–88.12: Nº of observations: 144)
Variables and Parameters Standard
statistics and values errors
Demand equation (dependent variable: QNIT)
22PNIT 20.014 0.135.10
22*PCOMP (25) 0.016 0.155.10
22*PCOMP (21) 0.017 0.153.10
PIMP (21) 1.35 0.178
PSEED (27) 20.93 0.119
T (22) 17.67 2.529
AGOUT 1.02 0.150
AGOUT (212) 0.37 0.056
QUAL (21) 211.92 2.266
CLIM (21) 1 (25) 0.22 0.029
Standard error 24.92
2R 0.81
Price equations (dependent variable: PNIT)
ENFERSA ERT CROS
Variables and Parameters Standard Parameters Standard Parameters Standard
Statistics and values errors and values errors and values errors
QNIT 16.55 0.687 48.99 1.729 54.95 2.211i
PFUEL 0.56 0.007 0.59 0.007 0.59 0.006
PNAPH 0.138 0.007 0.147 0.007 0.118 0.006
WAGE 2.57 0.073 2.21 0.064 3.20 0.082i
UC 24.21 0.878 29.06 1.301 10.63 1.050i
Standard error 1558.17 1624.19 1429.58
2R 0.96 0.96 0.97
Notes:
1. See notes 1 and 2 for Table 1.
2. The four equations are jointly estimated by GMM. The instruments used are the exogeneous
variables of the demand equation plus the eight cost variables (the two common variables and the six
specifi variables).
aggregated model (see below), lead us to impose a priori the zero constraints on
the coefficient of the cross-fir specifi outputs in the price equations. Therefore,
the full collusive equilibriums are discarded from the beginning, but the estimated
model should be considered a general specificatio compatible with all the
remaining outcomes. This is also a GMM estimation, without imposing the
theoretical constraints on the dummies and structure in the errors, the set of
instruments being common to the four equations. This disaggregated estimation
performs rather well, the most remarkable result being the different estimates
obtained for the output parameters in the price equations.
Table 6 shows the tests about behaviour and regulation based on the aggregated
model. Recall that the output coefficien in the price equation is a function of the
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Table 6
Hypotheses testing: aggregated model
Regulation Behaviour
Market-sharing (A51) Cournot (A53) Stackelberg (A55)
Non-binding (d 51) 32.21 5.76 0.47
Binding (d 50.87) 23.06 3.55 20.74
Binding (d 50.76) 16.88 1.85 21.70
Notes:
1. d 51 implies no regulation restriction on the price, d 50.87 is a naive estimation of the regulation
constraint (see footnote 13) and d 50.76 is the value estimated with the disaggregated model.1
ˆ ]ˆ2. The table reports the results of the tests in the form H : j 5 12 bgw(A)5 0, where w(A)5 [A10 d
ˆ(12 d )] and g is the output coefficien obtained in the price equation; z will be distributed as a t.
ˆ ˆ3. The tests are carried out with the parameters estimation obtained in Table 4: b 5 0.011, SE(b )5
ˆ ˆ0.001, g 5 16.42 and SE(g )5 2.28
price parameter in the demand equation, the d regulation parameter and the A
behavioural parameter. Then, the statistical acceptance of each hypothesis may be
tested as the simple acceptance of a non-linear constraint (see Table 6). But, as we
have no estimation for d, its values have to be provided exogenously. In particular,
we carried out the test assuming three alternative values for d : d 51, which
implies non-binding regulation; d 50.87, which is the result of interpreting some
available data on the firms proposals and the regulator decisions as reflectin the
13desired prices and the regulator constraints respectively ; and d 50.76, which is
the value of d we obtain endogenously in our preferred estimation of the
disaggregated model (see below). Alternatively, and given our purpose of using
this model as a device to restrict the set of possible outcomes, we could have used
an arbitrarily small number as the lowest value for d.
The main result of the tests is that the full collusive behaviour is clearly rejected
at the 1% level under any regulatory hypothesis (non-binding and binding at the
two specifie d values). The outcome is more ambiguous for Cournot behaviour,
that can be rejected at the same level in the non-binding regulation case and the
milder binding regulation situation. On the contrary, Stackelberg behaviour can be
accepted under both regulatory regimes. Therefore, the aggregate model points
clearly to the inconsistency of the most collusive equilibriums with the data, but it
is not very conclusive for the remaining outcomes: Stackelberg equilibriums (with
and without binding regulation), as well as Cournot under the strongest assumption
about the regulation constraint, can be accepted.
13 *Suppose that, at every review, the firm proposed a price increase D that, if accepted, would havet
pushed the price level to their desired (non-regulated) level. Then, the accepted price increase D wouldt
reveal the degree to which regulation constrained the desired price. That is
p p (11 D ) 11 Dt t 21 t t
] ]]] ]]d 5 5 5t * **p 11 Dp (11 D )t tt 21 t
* * *The scarce information available on proposals and decisions (D 50.32, D 50.25, D 50.33 and80 83 84
D 50.15, D 50.09, D 50.19) points to a stable d value of about 0.87. Note, however, that this80 83 84
value is based on the assumption of a rather naive behaviour on the part of the firms
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Table 7
Hypotheses testing: disaggregated model
Regulation Behaviour Firm equations Wald test Estimated d Implicit
*ENFERSA ERT CROS (degrees of (standard shares, s
freedom) errors) (standard errors)
Non-binding Cournot 32.24 4.35 2.66 122 668 (3)
Stackelberg 4.02 4.35 2.66 142 (3)
Binding Cournot . . . . 0.508 2.30 20.57 20.73
(0.043) (0.15) (0.07) (0.08)
Stackelberg . . . . 0.762 0.82 0.33 20.16
(0.065) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10)
Stackelberg (with S-repartition) . 4.35 2.66 75 (2)
Notes:
ˆ ˆ ˆ1. The firs three columns of the table report the results of the test in the form H :j 5 12 bg h 5 0, where g is the output coefficien obtained in the price equation0 i ii ii
of fir i, and where h53 for the Stackelberg leader in the Stackelberg model (ENFERSA) and h51 otherwise; j will be distributed as a t. The dot means that thei
corresponding model does not impose a constraint on the output parameter.
2. The fourth column reports the result of a Wald test of the validity of the constraints against the general model.
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ3. The tests are carried out with the parameters estimation obtained in Table 5: b50.014,SE(b )50.001,g 516.55, SE(g )50.69,g 548.99,SE(g )51.73, g 511 11 22 22 33
ˆ54.95, SE(g )52.21.33
4. The last four columns of the table present the results of the direct estimation of the general model in terms of the underlying parameters (entering in a non-linear
way). Due to the exact identificatio of the model, the only addition to the estimates of Table 5 are the reported estimated values and standard errors for the d
*parameter and the implicit s shares.
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The disaggregated model plays a crucial role here. Remember that from the start
we imposed the exclusion cross-output constraints. In this setting, the Cournot and
Stackelberg equilibriums under non-binding regulation, and the Stackelberg with
S-repartition regulation outcome, can be tested in two ways. First, we can test the
cross-equation constraints one by one. Second, we can test the global validity of
the constraints of each one of these models against the more general model by
means of Wald tests. The results are given in Table 7. The disaggregated version
of the model rejects at the 1% level each one of the previously mentioned
outcomes. So, we are left with only two possible results: Cournot and Stackelberg
under binding regulation.
To choose between these two models we will rely on the differences that they
imply on the estimated structural underlying parameter: d and the implicit
(estimated) shares. Only the Stackelberg equilibrium shows meaningful values for
the shares, although the smallest is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Then,
we conclude that the most likely situation given the data was binding regulation,
with an estimated d parameter of 0.76, that modifie the Stackelberg equilibrium
desired for the firm in the sense of imposing an extra output divided according to
the Stackelberg non-binding equilibrium shares.
Given our estimations of the demand function and marginal costs (implicitly
estimated in the price equations), it is possible to compute the monopoly solution,
the competitive equilibrium, and carry out a welfare analysis. Figs. 6 and 7 show
the real price set in the market and the quantities really sold in comparison with
the hypothetical prices and quantities corresponding to monopoly and competition.
The calculations have been done with the parameter estimates of Table 4, and they
can be seen as a sufficien approximation to more accurate feasible calculations.
Fig. 6. Prices in monopoly, oligopoly and competition.
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Fig. 7. Output in monopoly, oligopoly and competition.
The implied price–cost margin is, on average, 16 percentage points, the firm are
able to capture 27 percent of the consumer surplus, and the deadweight loss is
almost 4 percentage points of this surplus. Then, the oligopolistic interaction had
noticeable consequences. However the situation was relatively far from the full
collusive outcome, which would have implied a 29 percent price–cost margin and
a deadweight loss six times greater.
7. Concluding comments
The model has been able to select statistically the regulation constrained
Stackelberg equilibrium as the most likely outcome in the market, given the
observed data. In addition, the welfare analysis carried out with the estimated
parameters shows that the price–cost margins, the consumer surplus transferred to
the firms and the deadweight welfare loss were noticeable. However, this analysis
also shows that regulation was binding and, accordingly, was able to moderate the
consequences of market power.
The model is likely to be useful in other price regulation settings and in other
contexts in which more informal public supervision may be relevant to induce
firm not to price fully according to their desires. In addition, it includes some
suggestions as to how to treat empirically nearly collusive outcomes when an
agreement in the frontier of profit is not sustainable.
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Appendix A
Assume that domestic and imported fertilizers are imperfect substitutes (proba-
˜bly for geographical reasons) with demands, q5q(p,p ) and q 5q ( p,p ),M M M M
where the M subscript stands for imports. Under free trade p will simply equalM
p , where p is the price fixe in the imports market by the international producers.I I
In what follows, we will ignore strategic pricing on the part of these producers.
Public authorities intervened in the import market in two ways, firstly by setting
tariffs and secondly, by placing obstacles through non-tariff means to the level of
imports desired at each international price inclusive of tariffs. The firs interven-
tion simply transforms the relevant price in the above system in p 5p (11t), tM I
being the tariff. The second raises some difficul questions about how to model the
demand for domestic production.
¯With authorities fixin binding quotas q on imports, and competition forM
licenses, p would become an endogenous variable according the inverseM
˜ ¯relationship p 5p ( p,q ), and the relevant demand for the domestic producersM M M
˜ ˜ ¯ ˆ ¯ ¯would be q5q( p,p ( p,q ))5q( p,q ) with (≠q /≠q ),0 (this is, for example,M M M M
the situation analyzed in Helpman and Krugman (1989), pp. 36–38). But, in our
case, there were no publicly stated quotas and competition for licenses was not
possible. Instead, only some applications for imports were eventually accepted by
the public authority. This situation is probably better characterized as rationing in
the imports market, which presumably created positive spillovers on the market for
domestic production. In this context, the most sensible specificatio of the demand
schedule seems to be q5q( p,p ,m), where m stands as an indicator of theM
rationed demand in the imports market and (≠q /≠m).0 is intended to pick-up the
spillovers created by the public restrictive intervention.
Empirically, when p and the observed imports are included in the demandM
equation, both of them attract significan rightly signed coefficients This is
particularly clear when imports are instrumented to avoid the likely simultaneity
bias. We interpret this result as an evidence that neither the free trade nor the pure
quotas specificatio are satisfactory. Therefore, given our assessment of the likely
situation and the endogenity of imports, we prefer to include the evolution of
tariffs as an indicator of the likely parallel evolution of the administrative
difficultie to import and hence of the rationed demand.
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Appendix B
Let us use a double subscript, t denoting the year and s denoting the month. Let
t denote the moment ts (year and month) in which price is set, and 5 the
subsequent interval in which the maximum price will remain fixed Assume that
the firm expect it to last in total S months. Let us suppose, to simplify things, that
firm are identical, that they know with certainty the cost c of producing the nextt
interval, and that they set the perfect collusion price. Then, the problem is simply,
e¯Max ( p 2 c )qt t t
Pt
e e e1¯ ¯ ¯]where q 5 ( ) o E(q ), and its firs order condition is q 1( p 2c )(≠q /≠p )50.t ts t t t t tS
ts[5
According to the demand specification conveniently simplified the actual output
at time ts is given by the equation,
q 5 a 1 az 2 bp 1 vts s ts t ts
where a is the monthly seasonal effect, z represents a variable that shifts demands ts
and v stands for a random disturbance of zero mean. Therefore, the expected
average output at time t for the next relevant interval will be,
1 1 1e e e¯ ] ] ] ¯ ¯q 5 O E(q )5 O a 1 a O z 2 bp 5 a 1 az 2 bpt ts S ts t t tS S Sts[[ ts[[ ts[[
e¯ ¯where z represents the average expectation on variable z, and a is a constantt
(provided that an adequate number of months is averaged). From this expression
the deviation of the actual output from the expected average output at time t will
be,
e e¯ ¯ ¯ ¯q 2 q 5 (a 2 a )1 a(z 2 z )1 v 5 (a 2 a )1w 1 vts t s ts t ts s ts ts
where w can present some time autocorrelation, coming from an average forecastts
e¯error of the variable z. Replacing q in the price equation derived from the first
order condition, we obtain the corresponding price equation in terms of the
observed variables,
1 1 1e] ¯ ] ] ¯p 5 q 1 c 5 q 2 (a 2 a )1 c 1 ut t t ts s t tsb b b
where u 52(1 /b)(w 1v ). It is easy to check that the reduced form equationsts ts ts
for output and price will be,
1 a b 1
] ¯ ] ] ]S Dq 5 a 2 a 1 z 2 c 1 w 1 v andts s ts t ts ts2 2 2 2
¯1 a a e] FS] ] ¯ D Gp 5 1 z 1 ct t t2 b b
Several important things can be observed from this example. Firstly, the
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seasonal dummies should also be included in the price equation, and it is possible
to constrain them to gain efficienc in two ways: to sum up zero and fulfi a
cross-equation equality condition. Secondly, the observed output will be clearly
endogenous in the price equation, as is clear from E(q u )±0. Thirdly, we cants ts
expect some time autocorrelation in the error of the price equation, even in the
case of a fully specifie demand equation. Fourthly, the price can be exogenous in
the demand equation, as E( p v )50 shows.t ts
Appendix C
Data appendix
Quantity of nitrogenous fertilizer (QNIT): computed as the consumption of
nitrogenous products by Spanish farmers, plus exports less imports. The data are
monthly and they are expressed in thousands of tons. In estimation we use the
fraction of this quantity sold by the three firms
Quantity of nitrogenous fertilizer sold by fir i (QNIT ): computed as s QNIT,i i
where s is the yearly market share of fir i.i
Price of nitrogenous fertilizers (PNIT): computed as the weighted average of the
prices per ton of the different nitrogenous products, using their average shares in
demand.
Price of compound fertilizers (PCOMP): computed as the weighted average of
the prices per ton of the main compound products (those whose average share was
greater than 4%).
Price of imports of nitrogenous fertilizers (PIMP): computed by incrementing
the Eurostat price index of nitrogenous fertilizers by the amount of the Spanish
tariff on imports.
Price of seeds (PSEED): price index with 1976 as the base year.
Tariff (T): prior to 1985, the tariff which obtained in 1985. From the beginning
of 1986 onwards, the weighted (demand shares) average of the current tariffs on
the different nitrogenous fertilizer products, affected by the progressive reductions
established in the Adhesion Agreement with the European Community.
Agricultural output (AGOUT): value of the agricultural output, at constant
(1970) prices, in thousands of millions of pesetas.
Average quality of cultivated areas (QUAL): approximated by dividing the
agricultural output by the extension in hectares of cultivated area.
Climatology (CLIM): litres of water precipitation per square metre.
Price of fuel (PFUEL): computed by dividing total expenditures in fuel inputs
by the quantity used, expressed in thousands of tons.
Price of naphtha (PNAPH): price fixe by government regulation. We use the
ceiling price officiall established.
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User cost of capital (UC and UC ): the aggregate user cost is simply the averagei
of the user costs of the firms To compute the user cost of each fir we proceeded
as follows. The nominal specifi interest rate was computed as the ratio of its
financia costs to total debt. The rate of depreciation was set at a common value,
8.79%, given by the estimated value of the average life of capital in this industry
(11.37 years). As the rate of increase of the price of capital goods, we used the
increments of the price index for metallic structures.
Wage (WAGE and WAGE ): the aggregated wage is the average labour cost peri
hour of work in the industry. The specifi wages were computed by dividing each
firm’ total labour cost by the number of workers.
Seasonal dummies (D , D , D and D ): D 5January1February1March11 2 3 4 1
November; D 5April1September1October; D 5May1June1July1August;2 3
D 5December.4
For some variables (AGOUT, QUAL, PFUEL, UC and WAGE) the data were
on a yearly basis. Their yearly value was then adopted in our estimations for every
month of the year in question.
Data sources were several publications of the Ministry of Agriculture, the
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